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I. Introduction
Rule 23 is a mechanism that allows “one or more members of a class [to] sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all members.”1 The class action mechanism under Rule 23
is designed to allow for more efficient means of litigation in cases involving members who are
similarly situated with identical claims of action against the same defendant(s). In order to
ensure the prime efficiency that the rule is designed to accomplish a party seeking class
certification must satisfy many requirements including but not limited to the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites.2
Beyond the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a), in order for a class to be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), common questions must “predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members” and the use of a class action must be “superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”3 A circuit split exists regarding
whether Rule 23(b)(3) includes an implied requirement of heightened ascertainability in order for
a class to be certified. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits are in favor
of an implied heightened ascertainability requirement in order for a class to be certified. 4 The
1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Id.
3
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997).
4
Leyse v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., LLC., No. 16-1133-cv, 679 Fed. Appx. 44, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2607, 2017
WL 659894 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2017); Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 725 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2013); City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir.
2017); Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945 (11th Cir. 2015); Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302,
1304 (11th Cir. 2012); John v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, (2d Cir. 2006).
2
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Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have opined that there is no implicit requirement, and that
heightened ascertainability is not necessary for a class to be certified.5 Although the Supreme
Court of the United States has yet to address this particular issue, prior cases have established
precedent that is consistent with favoring a higher ascertainability requirement which indicates
that once the Supreme Court finally addresses the issue it will likely side with the reasoning
established by the Third Circuit.6
This Note addresses the issue of whether or not Rule 23(b)(3) should be interpreted to
include an implicit requirement of heightened ascertainability when determining whether a class
should be certified. This Note advocates for an interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3) which includes an
implicit ascestainability requirement resulting in a heightened ascertainability standard.
II. Circuits in Favor of an Implied Heightened Ascertainability Requirement
In Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., the Third Circuit reviewed a case where Appellant sought class
certification for 895 customers who rented or purchased laptops from the company Aspen Way.7
The 895 customers all had a spyware program called DesignerWare’s Detective Mode installed
on their laptops which Appellant alleges Appellee used to invade the privacy of the laptop users
in violation of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).8
Appellant provided two alternative propositions for class definitions:
Class I — All persons who leased and/or purchased one or more
computers from Aaron's, Inc., and their household members, on
5

Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017); Mullins v Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, (7th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992
(Eighth Cir. 2016); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015).
6
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S 338, 350
(2011) (“[Class action] claims must depend upon a common contention . . . . That common contention, moreover,
must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution . . . .”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 615 (1997).
7
784 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
8
Id.
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whose computers DesignerWare's Detective Mode was installed
and activated without such person's consent on or after January 1,
2007.9
Class II — All persons who leased and/or purchased one or more
computers from Aaron's, Inc. or an Aaron's, Inc. franchisee, and
their household members, on whose computers DesignerWare's
Detective Mode was installed and activated without such person's
consent on or after January 1, 2007.10
The Magistrate Judge found that the proposed classes were unascertainable and underinclusive
because the proposed classes failed to encompass all of the individuals whose information was
“surreptitiously gathered by Aaron’s and its franchisees.”11

The magistrate also found the

proposed classes to be overinclusive since not all of the computers with the spyware installed
were used to collect customers’ sensitive information.12
The Magistrate Judge also took issue with the phrase “household members” in the class
definition since (1) the phrase was not specifically defined and (2) even if the members could be
“gleaned” through public records this method was inadequate for the purposes of accurately
ascertaining the necessary information to certify the class.13 The district court chose to adopt all
of the Magistrate Judge’s findings.14 The Third Circuit addressed whether the District Court
“erred in determining that the Byrds’ proposed classes were not ascertainable.”15 The outcome
of this case is essentially determined by whether or not the court finds an implied ascertainability
requirement in Rule 23(b)(3).16 The court began its reasoning by making a general statement
that the basis for the ascertainability requirement “is grounded in the nature of the class action

9

Id. at 160.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
784 F.3d 154 at 160–61.
14
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 159.
15
Id. at 161.
16
Id.
10
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device itself.”17 The court cited to Supreme Court precedent which explained that the general
understanding of class actions is that it deviates from standard litigation procedures for the
purpose of achieving a more efficient judicial economy.18
Furthermore, since the class seeking to be certified bears the burden of demonstrating by
a preponderance of the evidence that it has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23, it is incumbent
upon the court to engage in “rigorous analysis” and to “probe behind the pleadings when
necessary” to discern whether these requirements have in fact been satisfied.19 This “rigorous
analysis” encompassed the implied ascertainability requirement at issue in this case.20 In order
to determine whether the party seeking certification satisfied the ascertainability requirement the
court provided a two-step framework. The party must show that (1) the class is defined with
reference to objective criteria, and (2) there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism
for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.21
The court emphasizes the fact that this framework does not require all members to be
identified at the time of certification.22 The party seeking certification need only supply a means
so that all members can be identified throughout the course of discovery without having to
engage in what the court refers to as “mini-trials.”23 The term mini-trials is not meant to
encompass any and all individual fact-finding; it is in reference to the ascertainment of individual
class members that require extensive fact-finding.24

The court overturned the district court’s

decision after reasoning that first, the underinclusive requirement was not meant to be a factor in
17
18

Id. at 162.
Id. (citing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)).

19

Id. at 163.
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
20
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the analysis of whether class members can be ascertained.25 Second, certification should not be
barred as a result of a class definition being overinclusive.26 Finally, the District Court
misapplied legal principles from Third Circuit precedent in Carerra when the court found the
phrase “household members” was unascertainable.27
In Leyse v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., LLC., Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Leyse brought a claim
against Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC (Lifetime) for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).28 The Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision
de novo.29 Lifetime disseminated a recorded message via telephone to inform viewers that the
show Project Runway would be broadcasted on a different channel. 30 Lifetime provided a third
party with zip codes of areas where viewers of the show were most prominent, at which point
another party supplied a list of numbers to be contacted.31 The source of the list is unknown, and
no copies of the list exists.32 Leyse received the message while he was living with Genevieve
Dutriaux whom the number was registered to.33 However, Leyse listened to the voicemail
message and he testifies that he was often responsible for payment of the telephone bills.34
The Second Circuit addressed whether certification should be granted when there is no
known list of class members who received the recorded messages.35 The Second Circuit applied
precedent finding an implicit ascertainability requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) stating that “[a] class

25

Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.
Id.
27
Id. at 165.
28
No. 16-1133-cv, 679 Fed. Appx. 44, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2607, 2017 WL 659894 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2017).
26

29
30

Id. at *46.
See Leyse v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139100 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 22, 2015).

31

Id. at *4.
Id.
33
Id. at *5.
34
Id.
35
Leyse, 679 Fed. Appx. 44, at *248.
32
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is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that are administratively feasible and when
identifying its members would not require a mini-hearing on the merits of each case.”36
Leyse proposed identification through individual affidavits along with records of
telephone bills in the targeted area at the time the message was disseminated. 37 The Second
Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling that this method was insufficient
in providing a readily ascertainable method for identifying class members since (1) no list of the
numbers existed; (2) no list was likely to emerge; and (3) it would be unreasonable to expect
members of the class to recall a phone call they received six years ago or still be in possession of
documentation of that phone call. Furthermore, allowing certification would result in “minihearings on the merits of each case.”38 The Second Circuit relied on relevant precedent from
Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., which provided relevant precedent.39 There, Plaintiff
already possessed a list of telephone numbers associated with the defendant in proposing to use
affidavits and phone records to document each individual call received and the telephone number
of each caller.40
III. Circuits in Favor of No Ascertainability Requirement

In Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., Defendant-Appellant ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra)
argued for reversal of class certification as a result of Plaintiff-Appellee Robert Brisenio’s
inability to demonstrate an administratively feasible method of ascertaining class members.41
The proposed class was comprised of customers residing throughout eleven states who purchased

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240 (N.D. 111. 2014),
40
Leyse, 679 Fed. Appx. 44, at *248. (citing Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240 (N.D. 111.
2014)).
41
844 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017).
37
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Wesson-brand cooking oils which were labeled “100% Natural” within the relevant period.42
Plaintiffs are purchasers of Wesson-brand oil products labeled “100% Natural” when in fact the
oils were comprised of bioengineered ingredients (genetically modified organisms). 43

The

proposed class definition was as follows:
All persons who reside in the States of California, Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, or Texas who have purchased Wesson Oils within
the applicable statute of limitations periods established by the
laws of their state of residence (the ‘Class Period’) through the
final disposition of this and any and all related actions.44
The court addressed “whether, to obtain class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, class representatives must demonstrate that there is an ‘administratively feasible’ means of
identifying absent class members.”45
The District Court granted class certification after finding that the proposed class was
defined by objective criteria—whether the class members purchased the oil.46 The Ninth Circuit
cites Supreme Court case Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey to support its conclusion that
interpretation of federal rules should begin with the language of the rule itself.47 The court
opined that the prerequisites of certifying a class are explicitly stated in Rule 23(a), and since
there is no mention in that provision of an independent ascertainability requirement in the

42

Id. at 1123.
Id.
44
Id. at 1124.
43

45

Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
47
844 F.3d 1121 at 1125 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163, 109 S. Ct. 439, 102 L. Ed. 2d
445 (1988)).
46
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language an implicit requirement should not be read into the provision. The list of provided
prerequisites should be treated as exhaustive.48
The Court challenged Third Circuit precedent (although not explicitly stated the court is
likely referring to Byrd since this was the most recent Third Circuit decision at the time, and the
only Third Circuit case the court has mentioned thus far) which advocated for an administrative
feasibility requirement in part for the purpose of mitigating administrative burdens. 49 The court
mentioned providing notice to absent class members as one of these administrative burdens.50
Additionally, the court contended that an administrative feasibility requirement for class
certification would effectively bar plaintiffs who are similarly situated as those in this case from
bringing suit since they would have no real alternative to bring their claims.51
The court also challenged the Third Circuit’s basis of protecting the rights of class
members.52 The court stated, “[w]ith respect to absent class members, the Third Circuit has
expressed concern about whether courts would be able to ensure individual notice without a
method for reliably identifying class members.”53 The court dismissed this concern because it
found no requirement in Rule 23 nor the Due Process Clause indicating that each individual
member was entitled to notice.54 It found only that “[c]ourts adjudicating such actions must
provide notice that a class has been certified and an opportunity for absent class members to
withdraw from the class.”55

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1128.
52
Id. at 1129.
53
Id. (citing Byrd, 784 F.3d at 165).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1127.
49
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The Ninth Circuit also challenged the Third Circuit’s concerns of fraudulent claims being
brought due to the absence of a feasible method of ascertaining class members. 56 The court
insisted that although valid in theory, the chances of this being a commonly recurring issue is
unlikely, and even in circumstances where this concern comes to fruition courts “‘can rely, as
they have for decades, on claim administrators, various auditing processes, sampling for fraud
detection, follow-up notices to explain the claims process, and other techniques tailored by the
parties and the court’ to avoid or minimize fraudulent claims.”57
Finally, the court challenges Third Circuit precedent from Carrera and Marcus v. BMW
which purportedly states that the administrative feasibility requirement is necessary to protect the
due process of defendants.58 In Mullins v Direct Dig., Plaintiff-Appellee, Vince Mullins sued
Defendant-Appellant Direct Digital, LLC for “fraudulently representing that its product,
Instaflex Joint Support, relieves joint discomfort.”59 Mullins contends that Direct Digital, LLC
made false statements regarding the uses and benefits of the drug including claims that the
product was clinically proven to have the advertised benefits when in fact the primary ingredient
of the supplement was glucosamine sulfate which is no more than a sugar pill which has never
been clinically proven to have any of the purported benefits.60 Mullins filed suit alleging
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS
505/1 et seq., and similar consumer protection laws in nine other states.61

56

Id. at 1130; Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BME of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
593-94 (3d Cir. 2012).
57
Id. at 1130 (quoting Mullins v Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016)).
58

Id.
Mullins, 795 F.3d 654 at 658.
60
Id.
61
Id.
59
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The proposed class definition which the district court certified. under Rule 23(b)(3) was
“Consumers who purchased Instaflex within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective
Class States for personal use until the date notice is disseminated.”62 The Seventh Circuit
addressed “whether Rule 23(b)(3) imposes a heightened ‘ascertainability’ requirement as the
Third Circuit and some district courts have held recently.”63 The court states that the Seventh
Circuit has long recognized the existence of an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class is
to be clearly defined and that membership be defined by objective criteria. 64 This implicit
requirement is not the same as the implied ascertainability requirement which the court is careful
to clarify.65
The court correctly chose to view the basis for a heightened ascertainability requirement
in light of the prerequisites listed in Rule 23(a) along with the additional requirements of (b)(3).66
The court insisted that since 23(b)(3) instructs courts to consider “the likely difficulties in
managing a class action” while balancing the countervailing interests in its attempt to decide
whether a class action is a preferable alternative to justly and efficiently address the dispute,
there is no need to incorporate into the rule an implied ascertainability requirement. 67 The court
found that reading an implied ascertainability requirement into the rule would “upset this
balance” effectively distributing absolute priority to one factor.68 The court cited precedent from
the First and Fifth Circuits finding that the implicit ascertainability requirement referenced in
these circuits have always referred to the adequacy of the proposed class definition rather than

62

Id.
Id. at 657.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 658.
63
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the difficulty of identifying class members.69 For ascertainability purposes, the Ninth Circuit
employed what it refers to as a “weak version of ascertainability.”70
It is important to note here that despite its finding of an implied ascertainability
requirement, the Ninth Circuit is categorized with its sister circuits which do not find an implicit
requirement.71

This is due to the fact that its application of the “weak ascertainability

requirement” bears a much closer resemblance to the circuits who do not find an implicit
requirement than those that do. The court stated that this requirement is easily susceptible to
alternative interpretation.72 The proper interpretation of the precedent which directs courts to
require that a class be “defined by clear and objective criteria” in order to satisfy the Rule 23
requirement for a class to be defined.73
The court then elected to focus on the three most common problems that have resulted in
denial of certification historically.74 The three problems the court pointed to were vagueness in
the proposed class definition, class definitions relying on subjective criteria (such as the mental
state of class members), and finally classes defined in terms of success on the merits of the
claim—otherwise known as “fail-safe classes.”75 Since the class definition complies with the
ascertainability standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit and avoids the three major problems
previously mentioned the District Court correctly granted class certification.76
In Sandusky Wellness Ctr., MedTox, a toxicology lab, used a directory from a health
insurance company to create a contact list comprised of 4,210 fax numbers to disseminate a one69

Id. at 659–60.
Id. at 659.
71
Compare Byrd, 784 F.3d 154.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 659–60.
75
Id. at 660.
76
Id. at 674.
70
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page fax informing pediatricians, health departments, family practitioners, and child-focus
organizations about its lead-testing capabilities.77 Out of the 4,210 contacts the fax was sent to
3,256 of them which included Plaintiff-Appellant Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC (Sandusky).78
Sandusky alleged a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and sought
certification under the following class definition: “[a]ll persons who (1) on or after four years
prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages regarding lead
testing services by or on behalf of Medtox, and (3) which did not display a proper opt out
notice.”79

The district court denied class certification after holding the class was “not

ascertainable, because it does not objectively establish who is included in the class,” and the
court would need to conduct individual inquiries to determine who the injured class members
are.80 The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion.81 The TCPA prohibits the
“use [of] any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone
facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement…”82 The Act provides for a right of action to
the recipient of the fax—not the owner.83
The issue here is whether a class can be ascertained through the list of fax numbers used
in disseminating unsolicited faxes when the subscriber is not ipso facto the recipient who has a
claim of right.84

The Eighth Circuit chose not to recognize an implicit ascertainability

requirement and focuses its attention instead on whether or not the class is clearly defined. 85 The
court finds that “fax logs showing the numbers that received each fax are objective criteria that
77

Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 995.
81
Id.
82
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
83
§ 227(b)(3).
84
821 F.3d 992 at 995.
85
Id. at 996.
78
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make the recipient clearly ascertainable.”86 As a result, the court ruled that the proposed class is
“clearly ascertainable.”87
IV. Interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3)
In interpreting a rule or statute, it is appropriate to consider the text, structure, purpose,
and history of the rule.88 When taking all of the appropriate considerations into account Rule 23
clearly provides for an implied administratively feasible means of ascertaining the members of a
class.
a. Purpose and Structure
“Class actions have two primary purposes: (1) to accomplish judicial economy by
avoiding multiple suits, and (2) to protect rights of persons who might not be able to present
claims on individual basis.”89 The inability for a party requesting class certification to provide
an “administratively feasible method of ascertaining class members” defeats both underlying
purposes of the class action mechanism: (1) the purpose of accomplishing judicial economy by
avoiding multiple suits since courts would have to resort to “mini trials” in order to adequately
determine which member should in fact be members of the class; and (2) the purpose of
protecting the rights of the individual class members since Rule 23(c)(3) requires only that the
court provide “the best notice that practicable under the circumstances.”90 Thus, members who
cannot be feasibly ascertained may not ever be notified that they are in fact members of class
action suit resulting in their being bound by a verdict in a case in which their participation was
completely unbeknownst to them.
86

Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.
88
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
89
In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
90
See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
87
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A key principle of American jurisprudence and a right derived from the due process
clause is that everyone is entitled to their day in court.91 More importantly, in light of the
recurring theme that has been stringently stressed by the Third Circuit with support from
Supreme Court opinions as well as Rule 23 itself, manageability of class action cases is pertinent
to ensure the proper use of the class action mechanism.92 The indifference displayed by certain
circuits with regard to the importance of ascertaining class members in the context class
certification is bound to result in serious manageability issues.93
b. Text
The text of Rule 23(b)(3) states that in order for a class to be certified under this
provision
the court [must find] that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.94

91

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) (holding that due
process clause dictates that claimants have day in court).
92
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d at 305; In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., PNC Bank
NA, 795 F.3d 380, 392 (3d Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3
93
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017); Mullins v Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, (7th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992
(Eighth Cir. 2016); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015).
94
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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Since Supreme Court precedent indicates that these four factors are “nonexhaustive,” referring
back to the text which immediately precedes the factors is a naturally expedient approach to
determining what other factors are to be considered.95 In analyzing the preceding text, it is here
that purpose, structure, text and history combine to reach a culmination that indicates the
existence of an implied ascertainability requirement.96
The Supreme Court in Amchem finds that “[i]n adding ‘predominance’ and ‘superiority’
to the qualification-for-certification list, the Advisory Committee sought to cover cases in which
a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results.”97 In an effort to account for the competing tugs of individual
autonomy on the one hand, and systemic efficiency on the other, the Reporter for the 1966
amendments cautioned: “The new provision invites a close look at the case before it is accepted
as a class action . . . .”98 This essentially directs courts to be more critical when reviewing
petitions for classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
The Use of Affidavits for Ascertainability Purposes
This section of the Note introduces affidavits to the ascertainability discussion. Circuits
which have chosen to implement an implied ascertainability requirement tend to be much more
critical of affidavits than those which have not adopted the requirement.99 However, even some

95

Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591 at 615.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
97
Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591 at 615.
98
Kaplan, Continuing Work 390.
96

99

See Mullins v Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); See also Carrera v.
Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
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courts that refuse to recognize the requirement do not permit the use of affidavits as a sole means
of ascertainment.100
Plaintiffs who seek class certification but lack the requisite documents or factual support
to ascertain class members will occasionally attempt to compensate for their lack of evidence by
providing sworn affidavits signed by each individual class member.101 This can present multiple
issues: (1) the potential class members seeking certification may be inclined to be dishonest in
their sworn affidavits; (2) the facts contained in the affidavit often occur years prior to the suit
being brought so the memory of the potential class member poses a considerable risk of being
inaccurate; (3) and lastly the use of affidavits creates a strong potential for mini-trials to arise
within the larger trial.102
Courts implementing a higher ascertainability requirement have found that the use of
affidavits as a sole source of providing an administratively feasible method of ascertainability is
insufficient for this purpose.103 Notwithstanding, affidavits are still permitted by these circuits
for ascertainment purposes if supplemented with records or other reliable and administratively
feasible means.104
Despite the Eighth Circuit’s blatant skepticism regarding the incorporation of an implied
ascertainability standard in Rule 23(b)(3), the court agreed with the Third Circuit’s reluctance to
allow members to be ascertained solely through the use of affidavits.105 The court expresses the
very concerns pertaining to administrative burdens that inspired the two-fold framework
100

Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 821 F.3d 992 at *4.
See Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 171.
104
City Select Auto Sales, Inc., 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that when supplemented by the Credismarts
database which limits potential claimants the use of affidavits may be considered as an administratively feasible
method of ascertainment).
105
Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 821 F.3d 992 at *4.
101
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developed by the Third Circuit while refusing to acknowledge that this concern is appropriately
articulated as part of ascertainability, superiority, or predominance.106
Requiring parties to accept sworn affidavits from their adversaries as a sole means of
ascertaining class members is not only unfair to the opposing parties who may have reason to
doubt the legitimacy of said affidavits, but also neglects to conform to the widely accepted
requirements laid out by Rule 23 to show that a preponderance of evidence standard can
reasonably be found by a court. Furthermore, such a finding would leave the door wide open for
fraudulent or erroneous claims107 which would undermine the court’s ability to adequately
manage a class action trial.
V. Interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3)
In interpreting a rule or statute, it is appropriate to consider the text, structure, purpose,
and history of the rule.108 When taking all of the appropriate considerations into account Rule 23
clearly provides for an implied administratively feasible means of ascertaining the members of a
class.
a. Purpose and Structure
“Class actions have two primary purposes: (1) to accomplish judicial economy by
avoiding multiple suits, and (2) to protect rights of persons who might not be able to present
claims on individual basis.”109 In order to determine whether the use of Rule 23 class actions is
appropriate in any particular case it is necessary to balance the two primary purposes against one
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another. If the protection of the rights of persons comes at the cost of the judicial economy or
vice versa then the use of Rule 23 to create a class action should not be permitted.
The inability for a party requesting class certification to provide an “administratively
feasible method of ascertaining class members” defeats both the purpose of accomplishing
judicial economy by avoiding multiple suits since courts would have to resort to “mini trials” in
order to adequately determine which member should in fact be members of the class as well as
the purpose of protecting the rights of the individual class members since Rule 23(c)(3) requires
only that the court provide “the best notice that practicable under the circumstances.”110 Thus,
members who cannot be feasibly ascertained may not ever be notified that they are in fact
members of class action suit resulting in their being bound by a verdict in a case in which their
participation was completely unbeknownst to them. A key principle of our judicial system is that
everyone is entitled to their day in court, but if members of a class who have a legitimate claim
have no knowledge or control of the proceeding they are involved in that right to a day in court
becomes substantially frustrated.
b. Text
Rule 23(b)(3) states that in order for a class to be certified under this provision
the court [must find] that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
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(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.111

Since Supreme Court precedent indicates that these four factors are “nonexhaustive”,
referring back to the text which immediately precedes the factors is a perfectly appropriate
approach to determining what other factors are to be considered. In utilizing this preceding text,
it is here that purpose, structure, text and history combine to reach a culmination that indicates
the existence of an implied ascertainability requirement. The Supreme Court in Amchem finds
that “[i]n adding ‘predominance’ and ‘superiority’ to the qualification-for-certification list, the
Advisory Committee sought to cover cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”112 Sensitive
to the competing tugs of individual autonomy for those who might prefer to go at it alone or in a
smaller unit, on the one hand, and systemic efficiency on the other, the Reporter for the 1966
amendments cautioned: “[t]he new provision invites a close look at the case before it is accepted
as a class action . . .”113
c. The Ninth Circuit
Reconciling the Issues
As part of its reasoning as to why Rule 23(b) does not contain an implicit ascertainability
requirement the Ninth Circuit cited to Beach Aircraft Corp. to support its conclusion that
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interpretation of federal rules should begin with the language of the rule itself.114 Although the
court is correct to inspect the language of the rule as its first step, its application in doing so is
fundamentally flawed. In Mickey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. the Supreme Court
was “hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous
another portion of that same law.”115 Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are proscribed
by the Supreme Court, it is perfectly reasonable to apply the same rules of interpretation to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Ninth Circuit criticized the Third Circuit’s finding of an implied ascertainability
requirement through reasoning that the prerequisites of certifying a class are explicitly stated in
Rule 23(a), and since there is no mention in that provision of an independent ascertainability
requirement in the language it should not be read into the provision.116 The list of provided
prerequisites should be treated as exhaustive according to the Ninth Circuit.117 Before delving
into the real substantive issue underlying this faulty reasoning, it is prudent to mention that
prerequisites are just that—prerequisites. By definition, prerequisites are meant to be satisfied
before proceeding to the additional requirements necessary for class certification. Thus, it seems
only natural that additional requirements should follow.
On a more substantive note, the Ninth Circuit makes the lethal mistake of assuming that
the Third Circuit intended there to be a heightened requirement for all three of the avenues
available under Rule 23(b), but this in fact is not the case at all. On the contrary, the Third
Circuit applies this additional requirement for parties seeking certification only with respect to
the 23(b)(3) avenue. It seems noteworthy to mention here that if Rule 23(b)(3) were to be
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interpreted in the manner proposed by the Ninth Circuit—without an implied ascertainability
requirement—this provision which is already the most commonly utilized avenue to request class
certification would be made even more lax resulting in a substantial frustration of the purpose of
the provision which according to the Supreme Court is to “achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”118
The court proceeds by criticizing the Third Circuit for its concern with regard to
providing individual notice to class members, and states that “neither Rule 23 nor the Due
Process Clause requires actual notice to each individual class member.”119 However, the Third
Circuit never actually required notice to be provided to each individual class member. In fact,
the court in Byrd cites to Supreme Court precedent stating “[t]he question is not whether every
class member will receive actual individual notice, but whether class members can be notified of
their opt-out rights consistent with due process.”120 Thus, the Ninth and Third Circuits are in fact
aligned in finding that no per se individual notice is required in class action cases. However, this
instinct by the Third Circuit to protect the rights of class members is also supported by precedent
from Walmart Stores Inc. where the Supreme Court finds that “[c]ourts adjudicating [class]
actions must provide notice that a class has been certified and an opportunity for absent class
members to withdraw from the class.”121 The Third Circuit’s concern for providing notice
mainly stems from the recurring theme of ensuring adequate manageability in class actions
without curtailing the class members’ due process rights.

The Third Circuit’s two-fold

ascertainability requirement reinforces this theme since proper ascertainment at the outset will
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minimize the risk of due process violations and ease the manageability of the case for trial
courts.122
d. The Seventh Circuit
In Mullins v Direct Dig., the Seventh Circuit acknowledges the existence of an implied
ascertainability requirement, but does not adopt the same framework as the Third Circuit.123 The
Seventh Circuit instead implements a “weak ascertainability requirement” which bears a much
closer resemblance to the circuits who do not find an implicit requirement than those that do.124
The court states that this requirement is easily susceptible to misinterpretation—and for good
reason.125 The court purports to find an “implied ascertainability requirement” that “a class be
defined clearly and based on objective criteria.”126 Notice that this language bears a very close
resemblance to step one of the Third Circuit’s two-fold framework which requires a class to be
“defined with reference to objective criteria.”127 This language is the only similarity between the
two circuits since the Seventh Circuit declines to adopt the second prong of the two-step
framework.128
Aside from the absence of a second prong, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as to the
purpose of mandating objective criteria129 is completely contrary to the Third Circuit’s
reasoning.130 The stated basis of the Seventh Circuit’s implied ascertainability requirement is
mislabeled altogether since the court states that the purpose of the rule is not actually for
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purposes of ascertaining class members, but rather for purposes of defining the class. 131 This
interpretation is precisely what the Third Circuit cautioned against when the court in Byrd writes
“[t]his preliminary analysis dovetails with, but is separate from, Rule 23(c)(1)(B)'s requirement
that the class-certification order include ‘(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of
the parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear,
and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.’”132 By
grounding the basis for its implied requirement in class definition, the Seventh Circuit is
essentially doing nothing more than restating Rule 23(c)(1)(B)’s text with the mere addition of
objective criteria.
Rule 23(b)(3) instructs courts to consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class
action” while balancing the countervailing interests in its attempt to decide whether a class action
“is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”133
The court finds that reading an implied ascertainability requirement into the rule as the Third
Circuit proposes would “upset this balance” effectively according absolute priority to one
factor.134 Although it is true that the Third Circuit’s approach prioritizes ascertainability, a close
inspection of the two-step ascertainability framework furnished by the Third Circuit which
requires that a proposed class (1) be defined by with reference to objective criteria; and (2)
include a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition

actually serves to promote both of these

interests.135
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The second prong requires a Rule 23(b)(3) request to include “a reliable and
administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within
the class definition.”136 This second prong is equally as important as the first for the very same
purposes as those that justify the first (which will be discussed in the upcoming section in the
context of affidavits) , but this prong actually serves one additional purpose. While the objective
criteria requirement is derived from the need to protect the sanctity and reliability of the means
being used to certify a class, the second prong ensures that the objective criteria is sufficient for
its purpose—the ascertaining of participating class members.137 However, the Third Circuit is
careful to clarify that actual ascertainment of class members is not needed for certification.138
Rather, only a reliable and administratively feasible method of ascertainment is needed for
certification in order to ensure that the trial can in fact be properly managed.139 The Seventh
Circuit is correct in finding that this too would effectively terminate the balancing test under the
Third Circuit’s framework—as it should.140 Nonetheless, these two requirements do not “upset
the balance” as the Seventh Circuit purports.141 On the contrary, the framework employs what
can be described as preliminary requirements that are indispensable in order for a trial court to
adequately manage a class action at all. Otherwise stated, no matter what factors are weighed on
the other side of the balancing scale, absent a class defined with reference to objective criteria
and an administratively feasible method of ascertaining class members the balancing must result
in a denial of the certification when FRCP 23(b)(3) is the provision under which certification is
being sought.
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e. The Eighth Circuit
In Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, the Eighth Circuit chooses not to recognize an implicit
ascertainability requirement and aligns itself with sister circuits that have elected to apply only
the requirements found in the “plain language” of the text.142 The court purports to employ a
“rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements”143 in reaching its holding. The court holds that
“fax logs showing the numbers that received each fax are objective criteria that make the
recipient clearly ascertainable.”144
This holding is perplexing since the court chooses to require that the ascertainability of
the class members be demonstrated through “objective criteria.”

This “objective criteria”

language is not found anywhere in Rule 23. Yet despite claiming to implement a “rigorous
analysis of the Rule 23 requirements”145 the Eighth Circuit essentially adopts the first
requirement found in the Third Circuit’s two-fold implicit requirement. The court neglects to
provide any reasoning as to why this requirement is included in its holding despite its absence in
the rule. Furthermore, not only does the court fail to acknowledge the fact that this “objective
criteria” requirement accounts for half of the two-fold framework furnished by the Third Circuit,
but it also fails to explain why the first requirement is the only one it chooses to adopt.
VI. Proposal
If the Supreme addresses this issue in the future, which seems inevitable given the
growing rift between multiple circuits on the issue, the court will likely favor the approach taken
by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits which have adopted the implied

142

Sandusky, 821 F.3d 992 at 996.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
143

25

two-step ascertainability requirement.146 The two requirements call for a party seeking
certification to show (1) that the class is defined with reference to objective criteria, and (2) that
there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative
class members fall within the class definition.147
The Supreme Court has clarified that the class action mechanism is “an exception to the
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'“148
The Supreme Court has also repeatedly emphasized the need to for a party seeking class
certification to affirmatively demonstrate its compliance with Rule 23.149 To ensure compliance
the Supreme Court has held that it “may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings
before coming to rest on the certification question,' and that certification is proper only if 'the
trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied.”150 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clarified that parties seeking certification
under Rule 23(b)(3) in particular must satisfy an even heavier burden due to this exception’s
“adventuresome” nature.151

The same analytical principles [as Rule 23(a)] govern Rule
23(b). If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance criterion is even
more demanding than Rule 23(a). Rule 23(b)(3), as an
adventuresome innovation, is designed for situations in which
146
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class-action treatment is not as clearly called for. That explains
Congress's addition of procedural safeguards for (b)(3) class
members beyond those provided for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members
(e.g., an opportunity to opt out), and the court's duty to take a close
look at whether common questions predominate over individual
ones.152

The implied ascertainbaility requirement is consistent with the burden of demonstrating
by a preponderance of evidence that it has satisfied all of the requirements of Rule 23.
Furthermore, it is consistent with purpose of the class action mechanism—achieving a more
efficient judicial economy—as identified by the Supreme Court.153 Some of the circuits have
misinterpreted and misapplied the two-fold requirement. The two-fold framework does not
necessitate identification of all members at the time of certification.154 The party seeking
certification need only supply a means so that all members can be identified throughout the
course of discovery without having to engage in what the court refers to as “mini-trials.”155
“Mini-trials” would substantially frustrate the purpose that Rule 23 sets out to accomplish—
judicial economy. Additionally, the two-fold requirement does not entail an
overinclusive/underinclusive evaluation of the members seeking certification as such an
evaluation would have little to no relevance with regard to the judicial economy of the case, nor
does it serve to help ascertain members of the class. The party seeking certification need only
supply a means so that all members can be identified throughout the course of discovery without
having to engage in what the court refers to as “mini-trials.”156
VII.

Affidavits
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Class action suits are generally filed years after the occurrence of the incidents which
give rise to the claim. The reliability of a witness’s memory years after the event can rarely be
considered reliable. 157 The only remedy to measure the reliability of an alleged class member’s
memory would require an individual evaluation of each member which is precisely the type of
“mini-trials” that concerns the Third Circuit due to its ipso facto frustration of a class action’s
purpose of achieving judicial economy.
The Sixth Circuit's support of this rule can be inferred from its decision not to overturn a
lower court's decision which was based on a finding that the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs
was insufficient for the purpose of identifying class members. The Sixth Circuit opined that “the
district court's recognition of the difficulty in identifying class members without fax logs and
with sole reliance on individual affidavits was equally sufficient to preclude certification,
regardless of whether this concern is properly articulated as part of ascertainability, Rule
23(b)(3) predominance, or Rule 23(b)(3) superiority.”158 The court's emphasis on the absence of
any fax logs or any corroborating evidence whatsoever indicates that the affidavits would likely
be deemed sufficient had there been fax logs or some other corroboration complimenting the
statements within the affidavits.
The courts that have adopted an implicit ascertainability requirement all require the same
type of corroboration as does the Sixth Circuit if affidavits are to be accepted as a means of
ascertaining class members.159 The circuit courts that refuse to recognize the implicit
requirement appear to be completely unconcerned with the need for corroboration since said
circuits do not recognize the need to ensure that the class is being defined through the use of
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objective criteria.160 Nor do the circuits need to confirm that the mechanism of determining the
class members is reliable. Although affidavits are generally accepted without corroboration in
suits filed individually, allowing individuals to join class actions in the same manner is an
impermissible extension of this practice since it is likely to result in an accumulation of minitrials to confirm the legitimacy of the affidavits.
However, requiring corroboration along with affidavits poses its own danger of leaving
many aggrieved plaintiffs without a means of pursuing their claims—particularly in cases where
the cost of the suit would exceed the cost of damages owed. If this caveat were to remain
unresolved, this would allow free rein for the corporate world to wreak havoc free of
consequence so long as the damage to each individual is minimal and unlikely to be documented
in any way. Additionally, given the tendency of large corporations to cut corners when
convenient there is little doubt that they would pounce at the opportunity to increase their
revenue at such minimal risk despite the moral obligations due to their clientele. Finally, even if
the companies' actions were truly unintentional and the wrongdoing was brought to their
attention chances are slim that any reparations would be voluntarily distributed to the harmed
individuals.
The solution to this dilemma was presented by Judge Beverly B. Martin in an Eleventh
Circuit concurrence.161 Judge Martin identified two major factors that courts had weighed in
determining previous cases where class certification was sought, but no documentation or
corroborating evidence could be presented to supplement plaintiffs' affidavits.162 The factors are
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1) the value of each class member's claim, and 2) the likelihood that potential class members
could accurately identify themselves.163
This solution is especially appropriate since it not only substantially minimizes the risk of
foul play on both the consumers' and the sellers' ends, but also satisfies the two-step implicit
ascertainability requirement that is so vital to maintaining the purpose of the class action
mechanism. Assessing whether class members as a whole would likely have an accurate
recollection of the circumstances which gave rise to the claim eliminates the question of
reliability. For example, a group of plaintiffs who purchased a bottle of oil two years ago with
no proof of purchase is highly unlikely to have remembered precisely what brand and specific
type of oil was purchased at the time the group is signing the affidavit. On the other hand, if a
group of musicians purchased a guitar several months ago, chances are much higher that given
their inferred background knowledge of musical instruments and the relatively short lapse in
time since the purchase that this group's recollection of the incident in question remains accurate.
Thus, the reliability issue in the second prong of the two-step ascertainability test is resolved.
Additionally, prior to certification a court must also be convinced that the value of each
claim is not one which would incentivize an objectively reasonable person to perjure herself.
This factor satisfies the objective criteria requirement in the first prong of the ascertainability test
since the penalty for perjury (in the vast majority of cases) will serve as a strong deterrent for
anyone who may have considered risking the possibility of being penalized when the stakes are
larger. Furthermore, granting class certification to cases that involve less valuable claims will
disincentivize any companies which might have otherwise sought to take advantage of this
loophole.
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Thus, affidavits should always be permitted as a means of ascertaining class members
when complemented with corroborating evidence. In the occasion that no such evidence can be
presented at the certification stage, affidavits may still be allowed, but only if the court
determines that 1) the value of each class member's claim is low enough to remove the incentive
for a reasonable person to risk the penalty of perjury; and 2) the class members are likely capable
of accurately identifying themselves.
VIII. Conclusion
The two-fold framework established by the Third Circuit is supported by inferences
which can be made from Supreme Court precedent as well as Rule 23 itself. A class which does
not satisfy these two requirements would create a very real risk of mini-trials for individual class
members within the course of adjudicating the substantive trial itself. A court that is forced to
engage in these mini-trials will frustrate the purpose of the class action mechanism.164
Additionally, the use of affidavits in the context of the two-fold ascertainability
requirement should be scrutinized by courts. Affidavits should not be allowed to serve as the
sole criteria for ascertaining an entire class unless the court finds that two factors outlined by
Judge Martin in Karhu165 weigh in favor of the party seeking certification. This rule functions to
preserve the purposes of the class action mechanism while extending as much leeway as
reasonably plausible to plaintiffs who would otherwise be unable to bring their claims.
Certification of a class is an extremely significant milestone in cases—especially those
with numerous class members. Once the class is certified, the opposing party generally has two
options: (1) begin what will likely be a long and burdensome discovery process which will result
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in the expending large sums of money; or (2) settle. The possibility that some defendants will
choose to simply settle a case to avoid a prolonged and costly discovery and trial process even in
circumstances where the defendant may not be legally liable for the claim brought by the
certified class poses a legitimate substantial danger to the American Justice System. It would
effectively create a plaintiff's market out of our judicial system in the context of class actions.
In light of this danger, a two-step implied ascertainability requirement which eliminates
this threat by requiring the use of objective criteria when defining a class and an administratively
feasible means of ascertaining class members seems perfectly appropriate—particularly when
those requirements are supported by inferences made from Supreme Court precedents that may
not have explicitly addressed the issue, but have clearly provided guidance on it in the context of
similar issues. The implied ascertainbaility requirement is consistent with the burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence that it has satisfied all of the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) as well as being consistent with the purpose of the class action mechanism generally.
Furthermore, it is consistent with purpose of the class action mechanism—achieving a more
efficient judicial economy—as identified by the Supreme Court.166
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